



WrightMUN

High School Model UN Conference Guide

Saturday, April 19, 2025

Wright State University

White Hall

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Conference Timeline (BRIEF)

8:00-9:00am	Arrival, Sign-In and Continental Breakfast
9:00am	Opening Ceremony (White Hall Gandhi Auditorium)
9:30am	Committee Session 1
12:00-1:00	Lunch
1:00pm	Committee Session 2
4:00pm	Closing Ceremony (White Hall Gandhi Auditorium)

Conference Timeline (DETAILED)

8:00-9:00am	Arrival, Sign-In and Continental Breakfast
9:00am	Opening Ceremony (White Hall Gandhi Auditorium) <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Drs. Shannon and Anderson Welcome and Announcements• SecGen and Deputy SecGen overview of conference
9:30am	Committee Session 1 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• UNHRC in White Hall Rm 101 (Gandhi Auditorium)• SC in White Hall Rm 120 (McGee Auditorium)
12:00-1:00	Lunch
1:00pm	Committee Session 2 <ul style="list-style-type: none">• UNHRC in White Hall Rm 101 (Gandhi Auditorium)• SC in White Hall Rm 120 (McGee Auditorium)
4:00pm	Closing Ceremony (Gandhi Auditorium)

Conference Staff and Roles

Staff

Secretary General **Angie Loyd**

Deputy Secretary General **Crystal Burns**


Security Council Director **Eliza Hendrix**

Chair **Brad Klingbiel**

Third Committee of the General Assembly Director **Marwah Almuzoughi**

Chair **Murphy VanBalen**

Faculty Advisers **Liam Anderson** and **Vaughn Shannon**



Secretary-General (SG): Head of the conference staff; assists Faculty Advisers in conference preparation; available to all students, staff, and faculty advisors for any questions or concerns.

Deputy Secretary-General (DSG): Assists the SG in all conference matters.

Committees are composed of a Director and Chair, collectively known as the Dais (*Day-us*).

Dais: Table at the front of the conference room where the Director and Chair are located.

Director: Staff member that is responsible for the committee. The Director decided the committee topics and wrote the associated Background Guide.

Chair: Staff member in charge of leading the committee in formal session in accordance with rules of procedure.

How Committee Works



Committee flows between formal and informal sessions. During formal session, decorum must be maintained as a sign of respect for fellow delegates and staff. It is important to note that in order to be recognized in formal session delegates must raise their placard.

The following activities occurring during formal session:

- Rules and procedures are enforced by the Dais
- Decorum must be maintained
- Professional conduct is always required
- Speakers' list is managed
- Policy speeches are conducted
- Delegates may not work on working papers during formal session
- Delegates may pass notes as a form to communicate with other delegates;

While in a formal session, delegates are not allowed to speak; however, they are allowed to pass notes. Notes are subject to inspection by the Dais at any time and all notes passed must be committee relevant and appropriate. Informal session is when the committee has suspended formal session for a granted period of time voted on by the committee.

Informal session is for the creation of working papers and negotiating between delegates. Delegates will negotiate policy and collaborate to generate working papers that outline the solutions to the topic before the committee. Once accepted by the Dais, a working paper becomes a Draft Resolution. During voting session, Draft Resolutions are voted on. If the Draft Resolution obtains the required votes then it becomes a Resolution. Only the SC has the ability to create legally binding resolutions.

Conference Rules and Procedures

Rules and Procedures are critical to maintain order and the flow of the committee. Delegates are to raise their placard to be recognized by the chair to make a motion, to vote, or during roll call. Understanding rules and procedure is critical for delegates. Please refer to the following for a list of motions that can be made in committee with an explanation as to the purpose and associated voting. For your convenience, a short form summary sheet of motions is included.

WrightMUN Rules of Procedure (Long Form)

Motion	Purpose	Debate	Vote	Explanation
Point of Order*	Correct an error in procedure	None	None	Refers to specific rule
Appeal of the Chair*	Challenge an initial decision of the Chair on a Point of Order	None	Majority	Question the Chair's ruling on a Point of Order
Suspension of the Meeting	Recess meeting for a defined period	None	Majority	Used to go into informal session or break for a given amount of time
Adjournment of the Meeting	End Meeting	None	Majority	Used only on final day; End committee for the year
Adjournment of Debate	End debate without substantive vote	2 in Favor 2 Against	Majority	Ends debate on the topic; Requires a recorded vote
Closure of Debate	Vote on all Draft Resolutions; Moves committee immediately into voting procedure	2 Against	2/3 Majority	Ends all discussion on current topic

Division of the Proposal (Used in voting only)*	<p>Consider clause(s) separately from rest of draft resolution to create an annex</p> <p>Part I: Procedural vote on if this motion should be considered.</p> <p>Part II: Substantive vote to accept or reject separate clauses</p>	<p>2 in Favor</p> <p>2 Against</p>	Majority	<p>Voted on in order of the most to least disruptive change to the document</p> <p>If passes: Annex passes</p> <p>If fails: Clause(s) discarded and no longer part of any draft resolution</p>
Request Recorded Vote (Used in Voting only)*	Document the votes of committee members; The default is to adopt by consensus	None	None	Granted upon request without deliberation, electronic voting replaces Roll Call votes; other motions may still be considered
Reconsideration	Reopen debate on an issue (Motion must be made by Member who voted in favor of Adjournment of Debate)	2 Against	2/3 Majority	Reopen debate on a topic that was previously ended by Adjournment of Debate
Set the Speaker's Time	Set or change the time allotted to each speaker	<p>2 in Favor</p> <p>2 Against</p>	Majority	Prior approval from Dais required or may be ruled out of order; never permitted during the first committee session

Close the Speakers List	No additional speakers may be added to the list	None	Majority	No additional speakers may be added to the list and once it is exhausted, committee will go into voting procedure
Reopen the Speakers List	Open a closed list	None	Majority	Reopens the speakers list allowing more speakers to be added
Adoption of the Agenda	Approval of agenda order	None	Majority	Sets the order in which topics will be discussed

WrightMUN

Rules of Procedure (Short Form)

Motion	Debate	Vote
Point of Order*	None	None
Appeal of the Chair*	None	Majority
Suspension of the Meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of the Meeting	None	Majority
Adjournment of Debate	2 in Favor, 2 Against	Majority
Closure of Debate	2 Against	2/3 Majority
Division of the Proposal (Used in voting only)*	2 in Favor, 2 Against	Majority
Request Recorded Vote (Used in Voting only)*	None	None
Reconsideration	2 Against	2/3 Majority
Set the Speaker's Time	2 in Favor, 2 Against	Majority
Close the Speakers List	None	Majority
Reopen the Speakers List	None	Majority
Adoption of the Agenda	None	Majority

Security Council Background Guide

Staff:

Director	Eliza Hendrix
Chair	Brad Klingbeil

Topic: The Situation in Sudan

Message from the Director of the Security Council

Delegates,

It is my honor to welcome you to this year's WrightMUN Conference. My name is Eliza Hendrix and I look forward to seeing the work you all will put forth as a part of the Security Council (SC). The SC is perhaps the most important organ of the United Nations (UN) system, being responsible for the maintenance of global peace and security. Each delegate will represent one of the 15 Member States that make up the SC and each hold one vote. Five of those members (the Permanent Five or "P5")- The United States, United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France- have the additional benefit of the veto: a single negative vote from any of the P5 on a draft resolution ensures the defeat of its passage.

Under the Charter of the UN, all Member States are obligated to comply with the Council's decisions. The Council will call on the parties involved in any issue to settle any threat to international stability through peaceful means and will recommend methods of adjustment or terms of settlement. While the SC will try to solve crises through peaceful and diplomatic means, the SC is also imbued with the authority to take coercive measures, including sanctions or authorizing the use of force, to maintain or restore global peace and security.

This background guide is intended to offer delegates a starting point for their research on the ongoing crisis in the Red Sea and Yemen. Delegates are encouraged to broaden their research on the topic to the greater context of the situation and to their Member State's policies. The background guide will offer the necessary information to begin delving deeper into the topic and will provide delegates the necessary tools to cooperate with other delegates in the committee.

Remember to have fun during your time at WrightMUN and that the staff are here to support you to provide you with any guidance you may experience. While there will be awards, this is ultimately a learning experience. I highly encourage you to take advantage of the committee staff to ask any questions you may have and to help make the most of your time working alongside your fellow delegates.

Sincerely,

Eliza Hendrix
Director, Security Council

Topic: The Situation in Sudan

Introduction

The current conflict in Sudan started as a political disagreement between the heads of Sudan's two largest military branches and quickly renewed ethnic tensions in the country resulting in over 11 million displaced people and the world's largest hunger crisis.¹ Armed conflict broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023 near the capital, Khartoum, and quickly spread across the country, particularly to the Darfur region in western Sudan.²

Ethnic tensions in Darfur first came to a head in 2003, when non-Arab militias revolted against Omar al-Bashir's regime.³ President al-Bashir utilized the SAF and the Janjaweed, a coalition of local Arab militias, to combat the insurgency, prompting the International Criminal Court (ICC) to issue arrest warrants in 2010 for al-Bashir and several military leaders on charges of genocide for their deliberate targeting of non-Arab Darfuri civilians, specifically those belonging to the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit ethnic groups.⁴ In 2013, al-Bashir formally established the RSF, primarily made up of former Janjaweed militiamen and leaders.⁵

After months of protests for a civilian government in Sudan, the SAF and RSF ousted al-Bashir in 2018 under the leadership of Abdelfattah al-Burhan and Mohamad Hamdan Dagalo, respectively.⁶ This led to the adoption of Sudan's Constitution of 2019, which put the country on the path to democracy until the two commanders led a military coup that ousted civilian prime minister Abdallah Hamdok in 2021, leaving al-Burhan and Dagalo in control of the government.⁷ Tensions between the two military leaders grew over the following years and eventually led to the eruption of armed conflict in April 2023.⁸ Since the outbreak of the fighting, the RSF has taken control of Khartoum and the four southern Darfur states, while the SAF has continued fighting across much of the country, particularly in North Darfur.⁹ As of October 2024, the RSF has continued its campaign in North Darfur by laying siege to the state's capital city, El Fasher,

¹ United Nations. Security Council. Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General (S/2024/759). 2024. p. 2, 5.

² United Nations. Security Council. *Letter Dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/65)*. 2024. p. 5.

³ Human Rights Watch. *Darfur Destroyed*. 2005. p. 1, 7.

⁴ United Nations. General Assembly. Report of the International Criminal Court (A/68/314). 2013. p. 6-7.; International Criminal Court. *The Prosecutor vs. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir*. 2010. p. 15.

⁵ Human Rights Watch. *The Massalit Will not Come Home*. 2024. p. 18.

⁶ Government of Sudan. *Sudan's Constitution of 2019*. 2019. p. 5.

⁷ UNHuman Rights Council. *The Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan (A/HRC/RES/S-32/1)*, 2021, p. 2.

⁸ Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2024*. 2024. p. 591.

⁹ United Nations. Security Council. *Situation in the Sudan and the Activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General (S/2023/861)*. 2023. p. 4-5.

leaving over 900,000 civilians trapped in the crossfire between the two warring parties.¹⁰ As of the latest briefing by the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan in February 2025, pursuant to SC resolution 2715, an estimated 2/3 of the country's 47.5 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, over 12.4 million have been displaced, and almost 25 million suffer from food insecurity.¹¹

International and Regional Frameworks

The United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) Guidance outlines a framework for the UN's support to countries in achieving their national development goals such as improving peace and security, in alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).¹² UNDAF provides Sudan with a comprehensive roadmap for the UN's support to the country's national development priorities, with a focus on addressing Sudan's political instability, economic hardship, and the aftermath of conflict.¹³ The UN's Cooperation Framework (UNCF) for the Republic of South Sudan replaces the 2016-2018 Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF), which served as a bridging program due to the absence of a national development strategy and was extended until December 31, 2018.¹⁴ The framework serves as a key document guiding UN agencies' work in South Sudan, strengthening capacity and institutions at the community, state, and national levels; this will include focusing on vulnerable areas with potential for strong partnerships.¹⁵ The United Nations Refugee Agency has reported serious concerns about violations of international humanitarian law in Sudan, including attacks on civilians, healthcare facilities, and the use of famine as a weapon of war resulting in the displacement of more than 10.2 million people.¹⁶ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is coordinating efforts with authorities and partners to provide support to refugees and internally displaced persons in Sudan and neighboring countries.¹⁷ UNHCR aims to aid Emergency teams establishing transit centers and distributing essential supplies, Assistance, with shelter, non-food items, and protection services, and Support for education programming for displaced children.¹⁸ Regional Refugee Response Plans (RRRP) coordinated by UNHCR and partners, address the peace and security of refugees fleeing Sudan to neighboring countries.¹⁹ However, The South Sudan Situation RRRP's are currently funded at just 24%, creating a substantial gap in the resources required to fully address the needs of the response.²⁰ The European Commission has a multifaceted plan for South Sudan, centering around three priorities to foster stability, resilience, and peace in the country.²¹ To implement these priorities, the European

¹⁰ United Nations. Security Council. *Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General (S/2024/759)*. 2024. p. 3.

¹¹ "Sudan: Briefing and Consultations." February 25, 2025

<https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/whatsinblue/2025/02/sudan-briefing-and-consultations-10.php>

¹² United Nations sustainable development group. *The UN Development Assistance Framework*. 2024. p. 6.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ United Nations South Sudan. *The UN's Cooperation Framework*. 2019. p.1

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ United Nations Refugee Agency. *Sudan crisis explained*. 2024. p. 1, 2.

¹⁷ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *UHCR data report*. 2024

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. RRRP progress report may-august 2024. 2024. p. 1.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ The United Nations office for the coordination of humanitarian affairs. Humanitarian update. 2024. p.1.

Commission has established the Multiannual Indicative Programme (MIP) for South Sudan, which allocates €208 million for the period of 2021-2024.²² In addition to the MIP, a multi-annual financing decision outlines a multi annual action plan for South Sudan for 2021-2022. This plan includes actions in "Peace, reconciliation and rule of law," and "Integrated support to education in South Sudan."²³ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) oversees the coordination of the overall humanitarian response in Sudan, collecting and analyzing data, publishing situation reports, and advocating for greater funding and access.²⁴ The central emergency response fund (CERF) has emerged as a vital funding source for Sudan.²⁵ In 2024, the CERF stands out as the largest contributor to Sudan's humanitarian needs with allocations directed towards addressing the food crisis and supporting vulnerable populations in hard-to-reach areas.²⁶ Save the Children reported that over 2 million babies born during the 18 months of conflict are at risk from the decimated healthcare system.²⁷ The UN's Children's Fund (UNICEF) focuses on protecting children in emergencies, addressing their specific needs for healthcare, nutrition, education, and protection from violence.²⁸

Role of the International System

The United Nations Security Council has taken several actions, having determined in S/Res/2750 (2024) and elsewhere that the situation in Sudan "continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region."²⁹ The Security Council created and maintains a sanctions regime against Sudan. SC resolutions 1556, 1591 and 2035 have stipulated measure and criteria as far back as 2004. Most recently, Security Council resolution 2750 extended the asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargo through 12 September 2025.³⁰

The Security Council has taken measures to support South Sudan, including extending a mandate until November 15, 2025 of The UN Interim Security Force for Abyei's (UNISFA) a peacekeeping force that monitors the border between Sudan and South Sudan, and facilitates humanitarian aid.³¹ This mandate was extended through Security Council resolution 2760 resolution maintaining the authorized troop and police ceilings for UNISFA while also calling for a review of UNISFA's effectiveness and alignment with the regional security situation.³² The African Union (AU) is a continental organization dedicated to fostering unity, prosperity, and peace throughout Africa by facilitating dialogue and conflict resolution mechanisms.³³

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs/The central emergency response fund. Sudan situation report. 2024. p.1.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The UN's children's Agency. Emergency Response. 2024. p.1

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ S/res/2750 (2024)

³⁰ SC resolution 2750 (2024) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4061079?ln=en&v=pdf>

³¹ United Nations. Maintain international peace and security. 2019, p.1.

³² African Union. *About the African Union*. 2024. p.1.

³³ Ibid.

The Security Council passed several resolutions on the Darfur region in response to the revolt against al-Bashir's government in 2003, including referring the situation to the ICC in resolution 1593 (2005), giving the court jurisdiction in the region to the present day in accordance with The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998).³⁴ The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, known by its acronym UNAMID, was established on 31 July 2007 through the adoption of Security Council resolution 1769.³⁵ UNAMID's primary mandate is the protection of civilians, but it is also responsible for ensuring security for humanitarian aid, monitoring and verifying the implementation of agreements, supporting an inclusive political process, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and monitoring and reporting on the situation along the borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) by creating a safe environment for aid workers to operate in.³⁶ The African Union Peace and Security (PSC) Council suspended Sudan's participation in all AU activities until a civilian-led Transitional Authority is effectively established, viewing this as the only path for Sudan to resolve its current crisis.³⁷ The Chairperson of the AU emphasized that there is no military solution to the crisis in Sudan, stressing that the ongoing fighting only extends the suffering of the Sudanese people and exacerbates the devastation in Sudan, including Darfur, after decades of conflict and forced displacement.³⁸ The United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) was established on June 3, 2020, by Security Council resolution 2524, with an initial twelve-month mandate aimed at supporting Sudan's democratic transition through political reforms, human rights protection, peacebuilding, and economic development.³⁹ Resolution 2579 (2021) emphasized ceasefire monitoring as part of the implementation of the Juba Agreement for Peace in Sudan (2020), support for the National Plan for Civilian Protection, and capacity building for the Sudanese police and justice sector.⁴⁰ However, The Security Council decided to end the mandate of the UNITAMS in Sudan (UNITAMS) through Resolution 2579 (2021).⁴¹ Security Council resolution 2715 (2023) called for a safe transition and the closure of the mission, with the transfer of its tasks to other UN agencies, funds, and programs to be completed by February 29, 2024.⁴² Since the beginning of the conflict, the international community, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia and the United States, brought the SAF and RSF together to address the humanitarian situation on two occasions in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in 2023.⁴³ Security Council resolution 2736 (2024) called on both sides to adhere to the resulting Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan (2023).⁴⁴

³⁴ United Nations. Security Council resolution 1593 (2005); International Criminal Court. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 1998.

³⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping. UNAMID fact sheet. 2024. p.1.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ African Union. Sudan suspended from the African Union. 2024. p.1, 2.

³⁸ African Union. AU commission chairperson expresses grave concern over the alarming situation in EL Fasher, Darfur. 2024. p.1 Darfuriian militias and civilians on their side of the conflict, contributing to the overall conflict and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) throughout the region.

³⁹ United Nations. S/RES/2579 (2021). p.1.

⁴⁰ United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan. Closure of UNITAMS. 2024. p.1

⁴¹ United Nations. S/RES/2715 (2023). p.1

⁴² African Union. About the African Union. 2024. p.1

⁴³ United Nations. Security Council. *Letter Dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/65)*. p. 37.

⁴⁴ United Nations. Security Council resolution 2736 (2024); United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affairs. *Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan*. 2023.

Weapons Supply and the Proliferation of Arms in the Region

Arms supply to warring parties in the Darfur region are in direct violation of the arms embargo established by Security Council resolution 1556 (2004) and greatly increases the illicit flow of weapons in the region, impeding progress towards SDG 16.4.⁴⁵ During the current conflict, al-Burhan and the Sudanese government have accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of violating the arms embargo by giving financial and military aid to the RSF.⁴⁶ The Panel of Experts on the Sudan created by Security Council resolution 1591 (2005) found credible reports that the UAE flew arms to AmDjarass airport in Chad where they were brought across the border into Darfur disguised as humanitarian aid.⁴⁷ Additionally, the panel also cited evidence that both the SAF and RSF were in violation of the arms embargo by arming local Darfurian militias and civilians on their side of the conflict, contributing to the overall conflict and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) throughout the region.⁴⁸ According to General Assembly resolution 60/68 (2006), the proliferation of SALW poses a direct threat to stability, peace, and security in conflict and post-conflict areas.⁴⁹ In response to these revelations, the Security Council adopted resolution 2736 in June 2024, reminding Member States of their obligations to adhere to the arms embargo in the Darfur region and calling on Member States to cease external interference with the conflict at large.⁵⁰

Addressing the Humanitarian Crisis in Sudan

Security Council resolutions 2573 (2021) and 2417 (2018) condemn attacks on civilians and emphasize the importance of protecting food supply in conflict-affected areas; however, fighting in Sudan has resulted in human rights violations, 8.1 internally displaced persons (IDPs), and nearly 26 million people experiencing acute food insecurity, making the situation in Sudan the world's largest displacement and hunger crises.⁵¹ The World Food Programme (WFP) has declared famine in the Zamzam refugee camp, home to over 500,000 IDPs near El Fasher, and declared thirteen additional areas in Sudan at risk of famine.⁵² Additionally, 14 million children are in need of humanitarian assistance with 19 million out of school due to the conflict.⁵³ According to Human Rights Watch, 70% of healthcare facilities in conflict-affected areas throughout Sudan were not functioning as of October 2023.⁵⁴ OCHA reported to the Security

⁴⁵ United Nations. Security Council resolution 1556 (2004). p. 4.; United Nations. General Assembly. *Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* (A/RES/70/1). 2015. p. 25.

⁴⁶ United Nations. Security Council. Letter Dated 6 May 2024 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the UN Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/362). 2024.

⁴⁷ United Nations. Security Council. Letter Dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/65). 2024, p. 15-16.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ United Nations. General Assembly. Addressing the Negative Humanitarian and Development Impact of the Illicit Manufacture, Transfer, and Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Their Excessive Accumulation (A/RES/60/68). 2006, p. 1.

⁵⁰ United Nations. Security Council resolution 2736 (2024), p. 3.

⁵¹ United Nations. Security Council resolution 2573 (2021), p. 3.; United Nations. Security Council. resolution 2417 (2018). p. 3.; United Nations. Security Council. *Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General* (S/2024/759), p. 2, 5.

⁵² World Food Programme. *Emergencies - Sudan*. 2024.

⁵³ United Nations. Security Council. *Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General* (S/2024/759). 2024, p. 4-5.

⁵⁴ Human Rights Watch. *World Report 2024*, p. 591.

Council in February 2025 that collapsing health services and acute hunger among over half of the Sudanese population requires “unprecedented” action in 2025.⁵⁵

In response to the growing humanitarian crisis, the international community facilitated talks between the SAF and RSF that culminated in the Jeddah Declaration in May 2023.⁵⁶ The Panel of Experts on the Sudan found that indiscriminate bombing in densely populated areas by both warring parties only make up a portion of the violence against civilians, as Sudan, specifically Darfur, has experienced significant amounts of ethnically motivated violence against civilians.⁵⁷ Both the SAF and RSF have engaged in ethnic-based recruitment of child soldiers and detainment and torture of civilians.⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch reported on the RSF’s ethnically motivated campaign against the Masalit population in El Geneina, West Darfur, where they engaged in mass executions of civilians, mass sexual assaults of women and girls, forced displacement, and the destruction of Masalit neighborhoods and IDP camps.⁵⁹ Security Council resolution 2736 (2024) demanded both sides take steps to protect the civilians of Sudan and adhere to the Jeddah Declaration.⁶⁰

Conclusion

The conflict in Sudan continues to intensify as the SAF tries to hold off the RSF in El Fasher, leaving millions of civilians in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.⁶¹ As of October 2024, the two warring parties continue to pursue military victory and have failed to engage in humanitarian talks with each other since the second round of Jeddah talks adjourned in November 2023.⁶² Continued military aid to the two sides in Darfur constitute violations of the arms embargo and contribute to the proliferation of SALW, threatening peace and security in the region as a whole.⁶³ The conflict directly deteriorates the well-being of women and children in Sudan, as both women and children are victimized by forced displacement and indiscriminate bombing campaigns, women and girls are subject to systematic, often ethnically motivated, sexual assaults, and children are adversely affected by the destruction of schools and the recruitment of child soldiers by both sides.⁶⁴ Despite SC resolution 2736 demanding that the RSF halt the siege of El Fasher and that there be an immediate halt to fighting there,⁶⁵ as of November 2024, the 900,000 civilians caught in the crossfire in El Fasher and the 500,000 IDPs experiencing famine in the Zamzam refugee camp urgently need assistance from the international

⁵⁵ OCHA. “Sudan crisis requires unprecedented action, OCHA tells Security Council.” February 26, 2025 <https://www.unocha.org/news/sudan-crisis-requires-unprecedented-action-ocha-tells-security-council>

⁵⁶ United States Department of State. Bureau of African Affairs. *Jeddah Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan*. 2023.

⁵⁷ United Nations. Security Council. *Letter Dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/65)*. 2024, p. 18-20, 31.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Human Rights Watch. *The Massalit will not Come Home*. 2024, pp. 94-101, 113-116, 126.

⁶⁰ United Nations Security Council resolution 2736 (2024).

⁶¹ UN Security Council. *Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan – Report of the Secretary General (S/2024/759)*. 2024.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ United Nations. Security Council. *Letter Dated 15 January 2024 from the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2024/65)*. 2024.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ S/Res/2736 (2024)

community.⁶⁶ Human Rights Watch most recently released a report urging investigations of both government-aligned forces attacking villagers in central Sudan, as well as SAF-aligned groups such as the Sudan Shield Forces in Gezira state.⁶⁷ With increasing accusations of war crimes, ethnic cleansing and genocide, the urgency to address the 20-month civil war is increasing as well.

Questions to Consider

As delegates conducting further research and consider how to address this topic, consider:

1. How can the Security Council help bring conflict in Sudan to a conclusion? What is your Member State's position on the conflict? Which side if any does it support?
2. How has your Member State contributed to solving the humanitarian crisis?
3. What risk does the proliferation of arms and the conflict at large pose to Member States in the surrounding region?

⁶⁶ United Nations. *Security Council. Recommendations for the Protection of Civilians in the Sudan - Report of the Secretary General (S/2024/759)*. 2024, p. 3, 5.

⁶⁷ "Sudan: Armed Group Allied to the Military Attacks Village." HRW, February 25, 2025 <https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/02/25/sudan-armed-group-allied-military-attacks-village>

GA3 Background Guide

Staff:

Director
Chair

Marwah Almuzoughi
Murphy VanBalen

Topic: Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid in Gaza

Message from the Director of the Third Committee of the General Assembly

Delegates,

Welcome to the WrightMUN! My name is Marwah Almuzoughi and I am the Director of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. The GA Third Committee tackles social, humanitarian and cultural issues. It has universal membership of the 193 UN Member States. Helpful background and information on GA3 can be found here: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/third/>. It is encouraged to become familiar with the nature and mandate of this organization.

This background guide is intended to offer delegates a starting point for research on human rights and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza since the start of the October 7 war. With a ceasefire in place at the time of this writing, it is an appropriate time to consider the matter of how the international community can respond to the various problems facing Gaza. This background guide offers many insights, facts, figures and citations, but is not intended to limit research to the content provided within it. Delegates are advised to ensure they can address all of the questions posed by the Director at the end of this topic.

Please remember, this is a learning conference and all delegates are encouraged to please participate! That means raising your placard, making policy speeches, and creating working papers. Should you have any questions, please approach the Dais and we would be happy to assist.

Sincerely,

Marwah Almuzoughi
Director, UN Human Rights Council

Topic: Human Rights and Humanitarian Aid in Gaza

Introduction

Gaza Strip is a small piece of land of 140 square miles with over 2.2 million people. Surrounded on land by Egypt to the south and Israel to the north and east, the territory and the administration by the Palestinian Islamist group Hamas but lacks sovereignty over its own affairs. Gaza heavily relies on the aid and resources of the UN and countries like Qatar, within the confines of Egyptian and Israeli control of borders, airspace and access by sea. With Hamas long bent on conflict with Israel under the banner of “resistance,” their ascendancy to power in 2007 has led to recurring violence between the two, affecting the humanitarian situation there.



The issue of human rights and humanitarian aid in Gaza is not new, but has received new urgency since the war begun by Hamas on October 7, 2023, and the Israeli response that escalated the humanitarian crisis to unprecedented levels of hardship. The matter for the UN in the Spring of 2025 is how to deliver aid effectively and guarantee the rights of the people in Gaza in the context of ongoing or recurring conflict. After 16 months of war, Gaza's population is dependent on internationally delivered food and other aid. Most are displaced from their homes and in need of shelter, water, and sanitation. As of this writing, a three-phase ceasefire plan in place since January, which allowed for aid delivery and the consideration of long-term political solutions, was faltering. Even if war resumes, human rights are a benchmark of international law, and humanitarian aid deserves consideration for stateless Palestinians caught in war.

Background

Gaza Strip is a small narrow piece of land that was part of the Ottoman Empire until the end of WWI, when the League of Nations granted the United Kingdom control under a “mandate” system of administration. The British were buffeted by pressures for independence from local Palestinians, broader Arab forces, and Jewish nationalists (Zionists). The British failed at attempts to broker two-state solutions from 1936-1939 and, after WWII, declared its intent to leave Palestine by May 1948. The UNSCOP committee was created to propose a solution to Palestine question. The resulting General Assembly resolution 181 (1947) called for the partition of Palestine into an Arab and Jewish state, a proposal accepted by the Zionist movement but

rejected by Arab representatives. An ensuing war led to the founding of the State of Israel whose armistice lines (or “Green Line”) remain a source of contention today.

Gaza Strip came under the control of Egypt, which cultivated an “All-Palestine Government” but, after the 1952 Egyptian revolution, merged with the United Arab Republic under formal Egyptian military administration.⁶⁸ Egypt largely left Gazans to the care of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), established by General Assembly resolution 302 (1949) with a mandate to provide humanitarian and development assistance for Palestinians who became refugees in the 1948 war.⁶⁹ Palestinian nationalist militias, many of whom formed the Palestinian Liberation Organization as in 1964, conducted raids from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, West Bank and Gaza, provoking Israeli retaliations against the groups and the governments who harbored them.

In the 1967 Six Day War, Israel not only won but seized multiple lands from Jordan, Syria and Egypt commonly known as the “occupied territories.” Security Council resolution 242 (1967) notes “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war,” and called upon “the withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” as well as the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency” and “acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and apolitical independence of every State in the area.”⁷⁰ One of the territories grabbed by Israel in the war was the Gaza Strip.



Regarding the political status of the “Occupied Palestinian Territories” (OPT) of Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem, UN General Assembly resolution 3236 (1974) reaffirmed the “inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine” to “the right to national independence and sovereignty.”⁷¹ Egypt negotiated peace with Israel in the 1978 Camp David Accords, but also included *A Framework for Peace in the Middle East* in which Egypt renounced territorial claims over Gaza Strip. Jordan ceded claims to the West Bank and East Jerusalem ahead of the PLO’s Yasser Arafat’s proclaiming the State of Palestine “on our Palestinian territory with its capital Jerusalem” on November 15, 1988.⁷² Some countries recognize Palestine, some

⁶⁸ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-Palestine_Government

⁶⁹ UN General Assembly resolution 302 (1949) <https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/files/nr005121.pdf>

⁷⁰ S/Res/242 (1967) <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/90717?ln=en&v=pdf>

⁷¹ A/RES/3236 (1974) <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-177305/>

⁷² “Palestinian Declaration of Independence.” *Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question*. <https://www.palquest.org/en/historictext/9673/palestinian-declaration-independence>

recognize Israel, and some recognize both, but the issue of a sovereign Palestine remained unresolved.

The “intifada”, or Palestinian uprising of the late 1980s, challenged the logistics and legitimacy of Israeli control of the territories. International pressure for solutions led to the 1991 Madrid Conference and secret PLO-Israeli talks that led to the 1993 Oslo Accords, a declaration of principles by which the PLO would renounce violence, recognize Israel and – in so doing – be the sole arbiter of Palestinian talks with Israel over the final status of Palestine. Such talks ultimately failed and violence renewed in 2000-2001, but negotiations produced peace between Israel and Jordan, and led to the creation of the “Palestinian Authority,” with limited administration and security powers in Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

With renewed violence and failed talks, the “Quartet” of the US, EU, Russia and the UN proposed the Road Map for Peace, a proposal endorsed by SC resolution 1515 (2003) for a phased process to get to two states living side by side in peace.⁷³ Israel chose a unilateral path of disengagement in 2004-2005, involving the removal of settlements from Gaza and the construction of a “separation barrier” around West Bank and Gaza in an attempt to prevent Palestinian militants from infiltrating Israeli territory. The UNGA adopted a resolution demanding that Israel halt construction of the barrier, and in July 2004 the ICJ ruled that Israel’s separation barrier contravened international law; that it must be dismantled; and that compensation must be paid by Israel to the Palestinian owners of property confiscated for causing widespread destruction of property and the disruption of the lives of thousands of civilians. A September 2004 Israeli military incursion into the Gaza Strip implemented the Israeli redeployment plan, leaving Gaza stateless behind Israel’s separation barrier.

Legislative elections for the Palestinian Authority were held January 2006. Palestinian residents in the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem were allowed to vote, and Hamas won a majority 74 of the 132 parliamentary seats. Israel, the US and the EU insisted that they would not work with or fund Hamas, which they classified as a terrorist organization. The Quartet group announced that financial assistance to a future Palestinian administration would depend on the extent to which Hamas renounce violence; respect agreements approved under the Fatah regime; and recognize Israel’s right to exist. Hamas rejected the conditions, and Gaza quickly became an isolated territory with few resources or allies. Palestinian civil war divided territories into those parts of West Bank controlled by the Palestinian Authority’s President and the PLO, and the Gaza Strip controlled by Hamas.

Egypt joined Israel in the cordoning off the Strip, both opposed to Hamas’ policies of political Islam, ties to Iran, and tactics of terrorism. Recurring conflict between Israel and the Iran-armed Hamas have taken place, from 2008/9 to 2012, 2014 and 2021.⁷⁴ All of these raised questions of Israeli force. A 2009 UN Fact Finding Mission created by the UNHRC to investigate violations of international human rights law and humanitarian law.⁷⁵ The Goldstone Report criticized Israel’s tactics and treatments of civilian populations, though the Report’s author, Judge Richard Goldstone later retracted part of the report claiming “Gazan civilians were deliberately targeted as a matter of Israeli policy.”⁷⁶


⁷³ <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-180005/>

⁷⁴ “The Israel-Palestine conflict has claimed 14,000 lives since 1987.” The Economist, May 18, 2021 <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2021/05/18/the-israel-palestine-conflict-has-claimed-14000-lives-since-1987>

⁷⁵ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/special-sessions/session9/fact-finding-mission>

⁷⁶ “Goldstone Retracts Part of UN Report on Gaza.” NPR, April 3, 2011 <https://www.npr.org/2011/04/03/135093832/goldstone-retracts-part-of-u-n-report-on-gaza>

Similarly, a 2014 UNHRC Special Session on the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) condemned Israel's "widespread, systematic and gross violations of international human rights



and fundamental freedoms” arising from the 2014 military operations in Gaza, citing “disproportionate attacks...targeting of civilians and civilian properties in collective punishment contrary to international law.”⁷⁷ Even between conflicts, the situation in Gaza raised concerns about its population and humanitarian needs there. Ten years after disengagement, and ten years ago, UN reports and Arab world analysts fretted over Gaza becoming “unliveable.”⁷⁸

October 7 and After

All of this was an almost-routine tragedy by comparison to what happened in Gaza on and after October 7, 2023. After the assault on Israel by Hamas, Israel retaliated with the bombing and reinvasion and reoccupation of Gaza. Estimates of casualties in the Gaza War vary from 46,000 to over 64,000 killed. Reports vary between the PA’s Ministry of Health and the Hamas-led Government Media Office (GMO) providing information out of Gaza, with various charges of bias amidst the fog of war.⁷⁹ The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) attempts to track casualty lists and other data.⁸⁰

South Africa took Israel to the International Court of Justice in January 2024 for violating the 1948 Genocide Convention in its conduct of the war in Gaza, leading to mass killing, mass displacement of civilians, and causing a humanitarian “catastrophe” by limiting food, fuel and medicine amidst intense bombing of civilian infrastructure.⁸¹ The ICJ rendered a provisional “binding order” that called upon Israel to take “all measures within its power to prevent the commission of all acts” of Genocide related to Gaza’s Palestinians as a group, including (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the

⁷⁷ <https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/special-sessions/session21/st-special-session>

⁷⁸ “Gaza Strip Faces Bleak Future after Israel’s Pullout.” The Arab Weekly, April 9, 2015 <https://thearabweekly.com/gaza-strip-faces-bleak-future-ten-years-after-israels-pullout>

⁷⁹ Gabriel Epstein, “Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable.” WINEP, March 26, 2024 <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-fatality-data-has-become-completely-unreliable>

⁸⁰ <https://www.ochaopt.org/updates>

⁸¹ <https://www.ici-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240112-pre-01-00-en.pdf>

group; (c) deliberately inflicting conditions calculated to bring about the groups' physical destruction in whole or in part; and (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.⁸² The January ruling, and a subsequent May ruling, refrained from calling Israel's actions genocide, but focused on the need for Israel to act to prevent these outcomes and demonstrate that Israel does not have genocidal intent. In follow-up orders in March and May 2024, the ICJ argued that the situation in Gaza "confirms the need for the immediate and effective implementation" of the January orders, and to allow "unhindered provision" of basic services and humanitarian assistance.⁸³ The Court also reiterated concern for the hostages and called for their immediate and unconditional release by Hamas, as well as called for parties to preserve evidence to permit investigations into allegations of genocide.

The International Criminal Court (ICC) went further, issuing warrants in September 2024 for the arrest of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant (and Hamas leaders) for war crimes and crimes against humanity, arguing reasonable grounds that the Israeli leaders "bear criminal responsibility for the war crime of starvation" and the creation of conditions "calculated to bring about the destruction of part of the civilian population in Gaza" due to the lack of food, water, electricity, fuel and medical supplies.⁸⁴

At the time of writing, a ceasefire in Gaza that had been in effect since January 19, 2025. Israel and Hamas agreed to the deal, brokered by the US, Qatar and Egypt, which provided for three stages: 1st, a 42-day phase in which the complete ceasefire is accompanied by the release of 33 Israeli and other hostages by Hamas in exchange for an estimated 1900 Palestinian prisoners by Israel; Israeli forces withdraw from populated areas to border zones while Palestinian civilians and aid trucks are permitted entry; 2nd, negotiations among parties have begun to attempt to agree upon a permanent ceasefire, which would lead to a complete Israeli force withdrawal from Gaza and return of all remaining living hostages from Gaza; 3rd, the reconstruction of Gaza and return of all remains of remaining hostages.⁸⁵

Existing Frameworks

Two areas of law and treaty are germane to the question of Gaza: international humanitarian law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHRL).⁸⁶ International Humanitarian Law (IHL) refers to the rules governing the treatment of those outside a state's authority in the realm of armed conflict specifically, derived heavily from the Geneva Conventions, their Additional Protocols, and the Hague Regulations (1907). Noncombatant immunity from violence and the treatment of prisoners of war are included here, emphasizing the distinction of combatant and non-combatant and the injunction to spare civilians and minimize civilian losses. IHRL refers to a series of largely post-WWII treaties stipulating human rights protections from state abuse, be it rights of women, children and races from discrimination, to rights to press, assembly and vote,

⁸² <https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/192/192-20240126-pre-01-00-en.pdf>


⁸³ <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/summary-of-icjs-order-24may24/#:~:text=The%20Court%20considers%20that%2C%20in,its%20physical%20destruction%20in%20whole>

⁸⁴ ICC. "Situation in the State of Palestine." November 21, 2024 <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-state-palestine-icc-pre-trial-chamber-i-rejects-state-israels-challenges>

⁸⁵ Raffi Berg, "What We Know about the Gaza Ceasefire Deal." BBC, February 2, 2025 <https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cy5klqv5zv0o>

⁸⁶ For a discussion of the differences, see International Committee of the Red Cross, "What is the Difference Between IHL and human rights law?" <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-difference-between-ihl-and-human-rights-law>

to the right to life, health and dignity of individual, including rights not to be tortured or subject to death without due process.⁸⁷



States, and even non-state actors with stable control of territory who “act like a state,” are to afford certain protections to those within their jurisdiction, be it individuals under detention or societies under occupation.⁸⁸

Occupation and IHRL

It is a matter of debate as to whether Israel was an occupying power from its disengagement in 2005 through its reentry into Gaza October 2023. The 1907 Hague Regulations state three components of determining a territory occupied: (1) the presence of military forces, (2) the exercise of authority by the presumed occupant, and (3) the non-consent of the government and people under control.⁸⁹ Israel physically withdrew in 2005, signaling its end of occupation. Hamas asserted control and authority of Gaza in 2007, triggering Israel to reclassify Gaza Strip as a “hostile entity,” leading to tightened economic and security measures over Gaza’s land access.⁹⁰ After the first of several conflicts with Hamas in Gaza, in 2008/2009, coupled with the 2008 Free Gaza Movement’s attempts to enter Gaza by sea, Israel imposed a maritime closure of the Gaza Strip. A naval blockade against belligerents is legal under the laws of armed conflict so long as it (a) does not have the purpose of starving or denying civilians essential objects for survival, nor (b) is excessive or disproportionate in damage to the civilian population.⁹¹ The International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion (2024) declared Gaza to be under “continuous belligerent occupation” by Israel, suggesting that Israel be bound not only by international humanitarian law but also the human rights law under the obligations of an occupying power.⁹²

⁸⁷ The chart is from Mahmoud Abdou, “International Law and the Territorial Controls of Non-State Armed Groups in Yemen and Libya (2011-2015).” https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Relevant-Bodies-of-PIL-IHL-IHRL-and-the-UN-Charter-59_fig1_360726423

⁸⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross, “What is the Difference Between IHL and human rights law?” <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-difference-between-ihl-and-human-rights-law>

⁸⁹ 1907 Hague Regulations Article 42. See also Bantekas and Jaber (2025), p. 5.

⁹⁰ Lisa Bhungalia, “A Liminal Territory: Gaza, Executive Discretion, and Sanctions Turned Humanitarian.” *GeoJournal* (2010), p.347.

⁹¹ “Israel, Blockade of Gaza and the Flotilla Incident.” ICRC <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/israel-blockade-gaza-and-flotilla-incident#:~:text=In%20particular%2C%20the%20tightening%20of,year%20later%2C%20in%20January%202009.>

⁹² For more information on the legal arguments, see Ilias Bantekas and Safaa Jaber, “The Human Rights Obligations of Belligerent Occupiers: Israel and the Gazan Population,” *Journal of Conflict and Security Law* (2025): 1-18.

Regardless of the debate about 2005-2023, it is beyond dispute that Israel has occupied Gaza since October 7, 2023, reigniting calls for the application of international human rights law (IHRL) relevant to occupation. HRC resolution 55/30 (2024) calls upon States to “ensure their obligations of non-recognition, non-aid or assistance with regard to the serious breaches of peremptory norms of international law by Israel,” and calls for cooperation to bring, “through lawful means, an end to” Israel’s “serious breaches and a reversal of the illegal policies and practices of Israel.”⁹³ Regional bodies have chimed in on the conflict. The Arab League’s 2024 Manama Declaration called for both an end to the fighting in the Gaza Strip as well as for UN peacekeepers to be deployed in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), including Gaza Strip, pending a two-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict.⁹⁴

On the matter of international humanitarian law, Israel claims to be acting in self-defense, to be taking care to distinguish military targets and avoid civilian-only targets—taking precautions to give civilians notice and time ahead of operations—while pointing out Hamas’ violations of law amounting to war crimes by deliberately targeting civilians, taking hostages, and using civilians as “human shields.”⁹⁵

On the matter of human rights in the Gaza conflict, The Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and Israel (2024), submitted to the General Assembly in accordance with HRC resolution S-30/1 (2021),⁹⁶ affirmed that Gaza was under “belligerent occupation by Israel, and thus bound by the 4th Geneva Convention and Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907.”⁹⁷ The Report listed several “Factual Findings, including the following:

- Israel carried out 498 attacks on 110 health-care facilities in the Gaza Strip between 7 October 2023 and 30 July 2024, killing 747 and injuring 969. As of July, 2024, only 16 of Gaza’s 36 hospitals are partially functioning at overcapacity
- While Israeli security forces issued evacuation orders to some hospitals, the Commission found the orders were not “feasible” to be “implemented in a safe manner.”
- Despite Israeli claims that “over 85% of major medical facilities in Gaza were used by Hamas for terror operations,” the Commission interviewed medical personnel who “denied there was any military activity”
- A June 2024 UNICEF report stated only two of three “stabilization centres for treating malnourished children” were functioning, in North Gaza Governorate and Deir al-Balah.
- Israel arrested over 4,000 Palestinians in Gaza between October 2023 and July 2024, many transferred to facilities in Israel for interrogation under the “Incarceration of Unlawful Combatants Act.” Israelis claim to conduct a hearing within 7 to 10 days,” and those released at crossing points lack procedures to ensure medical attention” or support, contributing to children being separated from family. Reports of mistreatment of detainees include being stripped, beaten, and given death threats, among others.
- 251 people were abducted and taken to Gaza as hostages on 7 October 2023, and that they were “held incommunicado without contact with the outside world, including ICRC (Red Cross).” There was credible evidence of some hostages being subject to

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ “Arab League calls for UN peacekeepers in occupied Palestinian territory.” *Al Jazeera*, May 16, 2024 <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/16/arab-league-calls-for-un-peacekeepers-in-occupied-palestinian-territory>

⁹⁵ <https://www.ajc.org/news/israel-hamas-and-international-law-what-you-need-to-know>

⁹⁶ <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/S-30/1>

⁹⁷ <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/262/79/pdf/n2426279.pdf>

sexualized torture and abuse. The Commission found that the “majority of hostages were subjected to mistreatment,” and reiterated “the responsibility of Palestinian armed groups” to “ensure adequate access to food, water and medicine” for the hostages.⁹⁸

As for detainees and their treatment, a 1998 Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organizations of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was endorsed by GA resolution 53/144 (1998), raising issues about the line between the right to protest and violent and nonviolent actions that warrant security responses. Israel’s Order 101 (1967) on the “Prohibition of Incitement and Hostile Propaganda Actions” requires assembly of ten or more in the occupied territories for the purpose of discussion on a political topic to have a permit or be deemed illegal.⁹⁹ Israel further claims that human rights law pertains to its sovereign territory, not extraterritorially in places especially in which Israel lacks effective control.¹⁰⁰

On the matter of humanitarian assistance, UNRWA remains the chief aid supplier in Gaza and Palestinian refugee populations in general. With the discovery of a small portion of UNRWA staff having ties to the Hamas attack on Israel, several countries cut ties and aid to the organization, including Israel and the United States. Others who suspended aid to UNRWA, have resumed.¹⁰¹ UNRWA noted its role in delivering aid during the Phase I ceasefire from late January through the start of March 2025, providing food assistance to over 90% of the population and restoring access services and health centers in Rafah, Gaza City, and Khan Younis.¹⁰² They boasted providing 64,000 people with tents, and half a million people with clothes and cooking equipment.¹⁰³ If the ceasefire fails and conflict resumes, the humanitarian crisis will become critical again.

Delivery of aid is still a matter of acquiescence by Israel or Egypt for deliveries by land, air or sea. Aid was largely absent from October 7-20, 2023, and since then has fluctuated between 300 and 4600 trucks per month, but all at levels most say are far below what is needed given the devastation of war on the economy and infrastructure.¹⁰⁴ Food insecurity is widespread, with a million Gazans facing famine or emergency food insecurity as of Fall 2024.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/262/79/pdf/n2426279.pdf>

⁹⁹ See Raghad Jaraisy and Tamar Feldman, “Protesting for Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Assessing the Challenges and Revisiting the Human Rights Defender Framework.” *Journal of Human Rights Practice* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2013): p. 423.

¹⁰⁰ Bantekas and Jaber, p.11-16.



¹⁰¹ <https://unwatch.org/updated-list-of-countries-suspending-unwra-funding/>

¹⁰² <https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/news-releases/gaza-strip-phase-one-lifesaving-ceasefire-draws-end-unrwa-reaches-2-million>

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Chloe Reouveyrolles-Bazire. “How Much Aid is Getting into Gaza?” *Al-Monitor*, October 21, 2024 <https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/10/how-much-aid-getting-gaza>

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.



Regarding statehood as a goal, HRC resolution 55/30 (2024) reaffirmed the Palestinian people’s right “to their independent State of Palestine,” while calling for Israel to end “its occupation of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem” and reaffirm its support for a two-state solution “living side by side in peace and security,”¹⁰⁶ recalling the July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that Israel as an “Occupying Power,” has impeded “the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.”¹⁰⁷ In 2002, the Arab League endorsed the so-called Arab Peace Initiative, reiterated in 2007, which called for a two-state solution in which Arab states would recognize Israel in exchange for Israel’s recognition of a Palestinian state at the pre-war lines of 1967, including Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem.¹⁰⁸ The Quartet Road Map and Arab Peace Initiative are reaffirmed in GA resolution 79/49 (2024) reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to “their independent State of Palestine” and call for the UN system to assist the realization of Palestinian self-determination.¹⁰⁹

The fate of Gaza, and Palestine in general, remains in limbo, between those who want a two-state solution, those who want only Israel or only Palestine, or something else. The status quo prevails given the deadlock over the lack of agreement by those with the power to do something about it. Among the issues of governing Gaza after war, some have proposed Israeli occupation, Palestinian control, or some form of UN temporary control. Some suggest putting the territory in UN Trusteeship,¹¹⁰ though some analysts note “the Palestinians, Israeli government, and U.S. government would almost surely oppose such a proposal. Instead, governments should consider other options, including an international transitional authority established by the UN Security Council or another international transitional authority perhaps “blessed” (but not necessarily administered) by the UN.”¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ <https://docs.un.org/en/A/HRC/RES/55/30>. Delegates should consult the previous HRC resolutions concerning Palestine, found here: <https://www.un.org/unispal/human-rights-council-resolutions/>
¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
¹⁰⁸ <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-181223/>
¹⁰⁹ <https://docs.un.org/A/C.3/79/L.49>
¹¹⁰ <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/trusteeship-council#:~:text=The%20main%20goals%20of%20the,towards%20self%2Dgovernment%20or%20independence.>
¹¹¹ Larry Johnson. “Should the UN Administer Post-Conflict Gaza?” *Lawfare*, July 19, 2024 <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/should-the-united-nations-administer-post-conflict-gaza>

Questions to consider

1. Does your Member State recognize Israel? Does it recognize Palestine? Or does it recognize both?
2. What is your Member State's position on Israel, the Palestinians, and the 2023 Gaza War? Did your country side with actions in the ICJ charging Israel with genocide? What is your position on the ICC charges brought against Israeli and Hamas leaders?
3. Does your country contribute aid to Gaza and, if so, by what means? What is your Member State's position on UNRWA as an entity to receive donations and be involved in providing aid in Gaza?
4. If considerations of a broader peace for Israel-Palestine are discussed, what is your country's views of the Quartet Road Map to Peace and the idea of a two-state solution?